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Abstract
Current research in molecular epidemiology uses biomarkers to model
the different disease phases from environmental exposure, to early clin-
ical changes, to development of disease. The hope is to get a better
understanding of the causal impact of a number of pollutants and chem-
icals on several diseases, including cancer and allergies. In a recent pa-
per Russo and Williamson (2012) address the question of what evidential
elements enter the conceptualisation and modelling stages of this type
of biomarkers research. Recent research in causality has examined Ned
Hall’s distinction between two concepts of causality: production and de-
pendence (Hall, 2004). In another recent paper, Illari (2011b) examined
the relatively under-explored production approach to causality, arguing
that at least one job of an account of causal production is to illuminate
our inferential practices concerning causal linking. Illari argued that an
informational account solves existing problems with traditional accounts.
This paper follows up this previous work by investigating the nature of
the causal links established in biomarkers research. We argue that tra-
ditional accounts of productive causality are unable to provide a sensible
account of the nature of the causal link in biomarkers research, while an
informational account is very promising.
1 Introduction – What is the problem?
Epidemiology has long established that environmental factors are important
causes of disease, but research so far has established only that broad classes
of environmental factors are correlated, albeit robustly, to classes of diseases.
Current research in molecular epidemiology aims to improve our understanding
of causal links between environmental factors and disease. In order to do that
scientists carry out precise measurements of levels of specific chemicals, and
measurements of changes that happen in the body at the molecular level, in
response to exposure to such chemicals. This is the core idea behind biomarkers
research, or, as the project we will discuss is called, ‘EXPOsOMICS’ (http:
//www.EXPOsOMICSproject.eu). What is sought is more precise assessment of
environmental exposure on the one hand, and identification of key stages in the
development or evolution of disease on the other hand.
This is frontier research, in which the European Union is investing a lot of
money, in the hope of making a significant move beyond the results of genomics
research, which were disappointing—at least in comparison with the overblown
expectations. It is exciting and challenging research, using methods that are
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new in their field. It is also highly interdisciplinary, involving at the least bi-
ology, bioinformatics, sophisticated statistics, etc. The novelty of the research
goes beyond interdisciplinarity, though, as it requires rethinking the conceptual
toolbox currently available for thinking about causality. In this paper, we will
be interested in whether we have good philosophical concepts to ask and answer
methodological, epistemological, and metaphysical questions raised by this kind
of research.
In pursuing this aim, this paper follows up earlier attempts to design con-
cepts that help philosophy of causality and scientific practice make progress in
saying what causality is, how we reason about it, and what it is that we track
when we track causal relations.
Russo and Williamson (2012) explored the epistemology underlying biomark-
ers research, arguing that scientists need evidence of difference-making and of
mechanisms to establish causal claims. The way scientists model the progress—
or, as they say, ‘evolution’—of biomarkers from exposure to disease borrows
elements of processes and elements of complex-systems. The integration of ev-
idence of difference-making and of mechanisms gives a better understanding of
the epistemology of difficult cases such as biomarkers. Nevertheless, the ac-
count offered in that paper was still too coarse-grained to offer a concept of
causal linking from macro to micro factors.
Illari (2011b), on the other hand, explored the concept of ‘productive’ causal-
ity, to use the terminology of Hall (2004) (see discussion in section 3), exploring
what the task of an account of causal production is. The paper argued that
at least one job of an account of causal production is to give an account of
causal linking that can assist our reasoning in ruling in and ruling out possible
causes. The paper suggests that an informational approach might be better
than available approaches, but this idea needs development and application to
a case.
This paper is organised as follows. First, in section 2, we present biomarkers
research, drawing out the novel features of the scientific project, and showing
how the project strains concepts of causal linking currently available in the
philosophical literature on causality. Biomarkers research is an excellent test
case for developing a philosophical account of causal production or linking, as it
shows the full complexity of science in practice, engaging with a complex system,
and looking for causes where they are exceptionally difficult to find. Throughout
the paper, we will examine whether we can get a sense of causal linking in
such a difficult case. Second, in section 3, we review the major philosophical
accounts that contribute to understanding causal linking, and show that they
are unable to satisfy the needs of biomarkers research. In section 4, we show
what an informational account can do better. In brief, it can do better because
it indicates a radically different way forward for addressing what causal linking
is, in a way that can illuminate our causal inferential practices. We finish, in
section 5, by showing how an informational account can ally with useful elements
of previous accounts, particularly a mechanistic approach.
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2 Tracing the evolution of biomarkers
2.1 Environmental exposure and the ‘exposome’
There are two previous approaches to finding causes of disease that are rele-
vant to the creation of the new approach of EXPOsOMICS, using biomarkers
of disease. The first is traditional epidemiology. It is known that exposure to
environmental factors cause certain diseases. These macro-environmental fac-
tors are usually a hodgepodge of various chemicals in the air we breathe, in the
water we drink or swim in, in the food we eat, in the products we use for clean-
ing or cosmetics, etc. The effects observed are also ‘macro’: the development
of diseases such as cancers, allergies, etc. Traditional epidemiology can find
out what kind of people are most exposed to environmental factors, in terms of
some specific health characteristics, or socio-economic status, or occupation. A
common approach is to assess exposure in a ‘coarse-grained’ way through ques-
tionnaires and interviews, and construct macro-categories of exposure. These
approaches provide very useful information about a possible mapping between
these macro-categories of exposure and disease. Yet this is all at the ‘macro’
level. Further, research tends to be organised in groupings, studying, for ex-
ample, risks of water pollution, or risks associated with different occupations,
and so is likely to miss interactions between these broad classes of factors. As
a result, a great deal is still unknown about long-term low-dose exposure to
environmental factors, which are particularly likely to be significant factors in
chronic diseases.
The second previous approach is genomics. Researchers sought to explain
health and disease through genetic features, changes, and modifications. Mul-
tiple technologies were developed, including: genomics to measure what is
happening to genes, transcriptomics to measure what genes are being tran-
scribed, proteomics which measures what proteins are being made in the cell,
and metabolomics which measures the levels of particular metabolites and so
various activities in the cell. In short, omics allow us to track a great deal of
what happens in the cell, from DNA, through transcription, to proteins made, to
metabolic processes. These technologies are often collectively referred to as the
‘omics’ technologies, for obvious reasons. The mapping of the human genome
had enormously high stakes. Despite the massive quantities of data collected,
relatively little has been explained about disease causation by genes. Specifi-
cally, mapping the genome, and genome-wide association studies (GWAS), in-
dicate that the genome cannot be the whole story. There is strong gene-gene
interaction in causing biological features, including disease. We found many
gene-disease relationships, but only a few that were as useful as had been hoped.
In addition to this, there are important gaps in the story about disease causation
due to genetic factors.
Biomarkers research is an emergent field that uses new technologies, particu-
larly omics technologies, to improve the assessment of exposure to environmental
factors. A biomarker is a ‘biological marker’. It is a characteristic which is ob-
jectively measured and that indicates normal biological processes, or pathogenic
processes, or a pharmacological reaction to a therapeutic intervention. The idea
is to measure exposure from biological samples, such as of blood and other bod-
ily fluids, to yield a much finer grained analysis of exposure. Biomarkers of
some kinds of exposure, and of some kinds of diseases, have been found and
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validated, but much remains to be done. Working with biomarkers allows a
great deal more specificity in assessing environmental causes of disease.
Finally, the concept of the ‘exposome’ arises. The exposome is the totality
of both external exposure to environmental factors, and also internal exposure,
which is exposure as measured within the body. The body has an internal chem-
ical environment, and the internal exposure includes biomarkers of exposure to
environmental factors, but also chemicals the body itself produces as a result of,
for example, inflammation due to environmental factors—see Wild (2005, 2009,
2011); Rappaport (2011); Lioy and Rappaport (2011). Thinking in terms of the
exposome means looking at environmental exposure in a global way. To make
this idea clearer, consider the similar movemement that happened in genomics,
from thinking that single genes could be identified as causes of disease, through
realizing the importance of gene-gene interaction, and epigenetics, to studying
the whole genome. EXPOsOMICS similarly moves to a global view of disease
causation, looking at total exposure (internal and external), and also seeking to
shed light on gene-environment interaction in disease causation.
Putting the concept of the exposome together with biomarkers research
yields the current FP7 project ‘EXPOsOMICS’, which aims to find out a great
deal more about disease causation by environmental factors by combining the
global approach of the exposome, with the kind of specificity allowed by trac-
ing biomarkers. Their aim is to identify biomarkers for key stages of certain
diseases—and particularly of chronic diseases—such as exposure, early clinical
changes, and disease development. For example, they might track specific chem-
icals (e.g., in the air, or in the water of swimming pools) and then track changes
that happen at the micro-molecular level internally to the body, by studying
biological samples from people. This is ultimately to allow the tracing of the
evolution of the disease, and be able to make predictions about diseases, given
the biomarkers found in an individual—ultimately building up an idea of how
lifetime exposure to certain environmental factors affects individuals. While we
are concerned with causes in this paper, it is worth noting that biomarkers are
not generally causes of disease. Useful biomarkers will indicate something on
the causal pathway, indicating exposure, early clinical changes, or disease de-
velopment. But some other biomarkers may be mere indicators that the causal
pathway is evolving, while not themselves indicating something actually on the
pathway. Vineis and Perera (2007) explain:
One of the main challenges with intermediate biomarkers is to under-
stand whether they belong to the causal pathway between exposure
and disease, whether they are simply a side effect of exposure or
disease, or whether their measurement is confounded by some other
exposure. For example, it is likely that certain mutations are gen-
uine intermediate markers in the causal pathway, whereas others are
a consequence of the disease, such as genomic instability that arises
in cancer cells.
Moreover we will not generally be able to act on biomarkers themselves, but will
have to discover where to act. Nelson et al. (2013) discuss the ‘actionability’ of
genetic results, but the same arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to biomarkers.
Ultimately there are multiple purposes of EXPOsOMICS, tracing the evolution
of biomarkers in order to explain and better understand causes of disease, in the
hope of ultimately acting on levels of environmental factors to reduce disease.
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The vision is to be able to ape GWAS, by conducting EWAS, or ‘exposome-
wide association studies’. The idea is that we need to study exposure in all
possible forms, particularly, if we can, in the detailed modes of biomarkers
research. On the basis of the experience of GWAS, it is suspected that multiple
environmental factors will be relevant to many diseases, that there is likely to
be interaction between different environmental factors, and of course interaction
between environmental factors and genes (see also Thomas (2006)). So the scale
of the challenge is well known!
2.2 Discovering and validating biomarkers
EXPOsOMICS is undertaking significant data-driven discovery. Although we
know a lot about the body, and about cellular mechanisms, there is no strong
general theory of disease causation at the molecular level by environmental
factors. Although the mechanisms of action of say, asbestos, thalidomide, or
passive smoking have been largely spelled out, the internal exposome still has
grey areas. A great deal is still unknown.
In addition to using the omics technologies, which alone yield vast amounts
of data, EXPOsOMICS turns to various other sources of data, such as sensor
technologies, imaging, electronic diaries, etc., and multiple tools for analysis
including high-resolution analytical platforms such as liquid chromatography
coupled to mass spectrometry and/or nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy.
They also use sensors and smartphones to collect measurements about individ-
ual physical activity and environmental data (air pollution and level of chem-
icals in, for example, swimming pool water). Scientists are designing studies
where individuals wear palm-size units in back or front packs, connected to their
smartphones, allowing GPS and motion sensors to record location of users, and
accurate estimates of pollutants in the air.
Scientists are looking for the causal relation flowing from environmental ex-
posure to disease, by measurement of relevant biomarkers to allow the study at
different molecular levels of the effect of exposure on environmental agents, and
the induced changes in cell metabolism. In the majority of studies, however,
we cannot generally intervene on the environment, or manipulate biomarkers
of early clinical changes either; in fact one problem EXPOsOMICS tries to ad-
dress is discriminating between biomarkers that indicate causes of disease and
those that indicate effects of the disease. Instead, other studies are called ex-
perimental because they recruit participants (e.g., adult, healthy, non-smoking)
volunteers (who are informed and give consent) to measure water or air pollu-
tion after they have been exposed. In the ‘PISCINA’ study, swimmers in pools
are exposed to water disinfection by-products, which are absorbed by the skin
and inhaled. The study measures levels of these by-products to assess a) expo-
sure to chlorination by-products in swimmers, b) short-term respiratory health
effects and c) genetic damage after swimming. The PISCINA study evaluated
biomarkers analysing blood, urine, and exhaled breath condensate (Kogevinas
et al., 2010; Font-Ribera et al., 2010; Richardson et al., 2010).
The outline methodology of EXPOsOMICS is conceptualised as ‘meeting-
in-the-middle’, first put forward by Vineis and Perera (2007) and subsequently
developed by Chadeau-Hyam et al. (2011). EXPOsOMICS is faced with a com-
plex interacting system, which we are pretty certain consists of multiple inter-
acting causal links. The point of the meeting-in-the-middle methodology is to
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probe these unknown causal links, to extract some kind of knowledge of the com-
plex causal structure. Broadly, this involves finding biomarkers of exposure and
biomarkers of disease outcome, and then finding the ‘intermediate’ biomarkers
that link exposure and disease, which are located in the middle of the causal
network from exposure to disease.
More specifically, meeting-in-the-middle involves combining the results of
prospective and retrospective studies. From prospective studies, scientists ex-
tract information about preclinical biomarkers related to particular exposures.
From retrospective studies, they extract information that backtracks from clin-
ical disease to preclinical response to exposure. The crucial meeting-in-the-
middle bit is in trying to find the overlap, that is, those biomarkers that are
good predictors of disease and that are associated with exposure. This is when
scientists start to link up the evolution of the disease, tracking from cause to
effect, for that exposure and that disease. This is the simple story, which will
not capture interaction effects. Certainly, EXPOsOMICS researchers use uni-
variate models, comparing factors separately, to measure the marginal effect of
each marker. But they also use highly complex multivariate approaches to try
to identify the best combination of candidates to predict disease onset, in an
attempt to capture interaction effects.
For instance, the work we have mentioned by Chadeau-Hyam et al. (2011)
describes a pilot study using data from the European Prospective Investigation
into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC). Researchers compared spectra of plasma
samples from 24 cases of colon cancer and 19 cases of breast cancer against
43 controls. Those plasma samples were collected on average 7 years before
appearance of cancer. The comparison between cases and controls allowed re-
searchers to identify a putative list of intermediate biomarkers linking exposure
and disease.
There are very important design issues for these trials, including when to
make the measurements, whether the results of one study are exportable to
other contexts—external validity—and identification of false positives and false
negatives (see also Vlaanderen et al. (2010)). Nevertheless, the work aims to
find causal pathways from exposure to disease, particularly aiming to trace the
missing links from macro-environmental exposure to micro-molecular changes
in the body, and so to the evolution of disease. The thought is that this missing
link is given by biochemical pathways. Thomas (2006, p490) says:
Using these “-omics” technologies to inform hypothesis-directed pathway-
based approaches to molecular epidemiology and to help direct genome-
wide exploratory analyses into more promising directions. [. . . ] One
might think of the “-omics” data as providing the missing link among
exposure, genes, and disease.
The scientists involved are aware of these design problems, which are due to
the level of unknowns. They frequently talk of ‘picking up signals’, trying to
gather as much relevant data as possible. They make measurements on blood
samples before and after the exposure under the hypothesis that there is a short
latency to see the effects of pollutants and chemicals. However, they also seek
to catch odd temporal effects, so they try to base decisions about measurement
on as little biological theory as possible, hoping to strengthen the theory at the
same time. That is why in some cases they will opt for 2 measurements, at
different times from the exposure event.
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The statistics used in biomarkers is very complex and cannot be done with no
biological understanding whatsoever. For instance, they build networks to find
(explore, validate) the interactions in the exposome (biomarkers of exposure,
of early changes, of disease). But statisticians receive row data from the labs,
and they have to clean up the data (instrumental errors, normalization, etc.)
before analysis. The statistical results they obtain need an interpretation from
the biological perspective. For example, it can make statistical sense to exclude
outlying observations, but these may be important from the biological point of
view, and mere statistics cannot offer a biological point of view.
2.3 The problems for EXPOsOMICS
In summary, thinking in terms of EXPOsOMICS, using biomarkers, allows epi-
demiology to take an approach to disease causation by environmental factors
that is both more global, in considering multiple factors and the environment
both external and internal to the body, and more precise due to using biomark-
ers. Two processes are tracked: (i) what happens to the body when it is exposed
to certain chemicals, (ii) what happens within the body once the body is ex-
posed.
A great deal is known about such disease causation, but this only serves to
highlight what remains unknown. We know we have a complex interacting sys-
tem of disease causation, involving genetic and environmental factors. We know
quite a lot about the system, with many causal links we’re perfectly well aware
of, and many known mechanisms that we suspect are affected by environmental
factors. Previous work, particularly on genomics, has alerted us to the fact
that there is a great deal about disease causation still unknown. Previous work
also leads us to suspect there will be multiple causes, that have small effects,
and strong interaction effects. Previous epidemiological work leads us to sus-
pect that widely divergent kinds of factors will be relevant to disease causation,
such as changing social structures that alter people’s eating habits, or exposure
to pollution, as well as the more obvious exposure to particular substances,
or radiation. The EXPOsOMICS project is bringing to bear relatively new
omics technologies, alongside data gathered from, for example, smartphones, to
make really comprehensive measurements of exposure. This generates a data
deluge problem, and interdisciplinary interpretation problems due to the mul-
tiple sources of data and different fields involved. The upshot of all this is that
projects such as EXPOsOMICS are trying to trace unknown difficult-to-find
causal links in the middle of the mess. Yet this is a challenge that must be met
if we are to push forward the frontiers of our understanding of disease.
3 Traditional accounts of causal production
3.1 Productive causality: from Hall to EXPOsOMICS
Since Hall (2004), the causality literature has recognised two potential con-
cepts of causality. The first Hall calls ‘dependence’, but is also often called
‘difference-making’, and accounts of causality falling in this category include
the counterfactual theory, manipulationist and, to some extent, Bayes’ nets ac-
counts, which all focus on measuring different types of co-variations between
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cause and effect, in abstraction from any particular link between them. The
second concept Hall calls ‘production’, and this is the approach we address in
this paper. Productive causality is concerned with how causes produce their
effects, with how cause and effect are linked.
Whether Hall has genuinely identified two distinct concepts of causation, as
he claims, is of course disputed. So is the question of whether a productive
account of causality can capture everything that is needed for an account of
causality. We tend to the view that you are likely to have to pay attention to
both dependence or difference-making, and to production, in order to answer
all the questions concerning causality you are likely to want to ask. However,
we think that we still need a better understanding of the concept of productive
causality itself, even to make progress on the question of how production and
dependence may or may not be related. A better understanding of productive
causality is our project in this paper.
Existing work has examined the importance of causal production in causal
inferential practice in the sciences (Illari, 2011b; Clarke et al., 2012, 2013).
There, the core importance of reasoning about causal production is as a way of
ruling in and out possible causes, on the basis of what is known of causal linking.
This is crucial in helping us to decide which correlations to dismiss, and which
to take seriously as possible indicators of unconfounded correlations—as causal
relations. This is a very serious problem in any large dataset.
This is a style of reasoning that difference-making accounts of causality do
not address. They provide means of ruling out confounding, true, but these are
based on further difference-making relations, or means of constraining how we
get evidence of difference-making relations, such as randomized or controlled
trials. They do not provide any element beyond the difference-making we try
to detect in finding correlations, with which to structure the dataset. They do
not give an account of how built up background knowledge of causes affects the
design and interpretation of current studies.
Note that evidence of production, and of difference-making, are often found
in a way that is intertwined. Correlations can provide some prima facie evidence
of mechanism, as well as of difference-making. This issue is examined in detail
in Illari (2011a); Russo and Williamson (2011); Clarke et al. (2012); Russo
(2011), which all examine the integration of evidence of production (specifically
of mechanisms) and of difference making in causal inference in medicine and
epidemiology. But evidence of production is also sought in understanding means
of transmission of influence, such as radiation, or bringing to bear background
knowledge of possible causes, in the form of mechanisms already known to link
particular causes to their effects.
It is the linking between exposure and disease that EXPOsOMICS scientists
are struggling to conceptualise. Consider for example Vineis et al. (2009):
The ultimate goal of using “-omics” technologies to identify envi-
ronmental causes of disease is to derive an integrated view of the
biological processes involved in the continuum from exposure to dis-
ease.
They are not merely trying to find out whether C causes E (i.e., whether
environmental exposure causes disease, say cancer or allergies), but to discover
the process of evolution of disease from environmental exposure, to find the con-
nections and map the causal structure—indeed, causal structures. This linking
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is measured at the molecular level as explained in the previous section, and re-
sults of measurements analysed through complex interaction between statistics,
bioinformatics, and biological theory. Given the scale of what is unknown, there
is a need coming from the science for a way of conceptualising this linking, con-
ceptualising what EXPOsOMICS scientists are trying to track, in a way that
can usefully guide their causal reasoning, meeting the needs identified in section
2.3. A peculiarity of the EXPOsOMICS approach is the diachronic assessment
of biomarkers. (Vineis and Chadeau-Hyam, 2011, sec.4) explain:
Recently, Sandro Galea has proposed to generalise mathematical
approaches initially designed to study infectious disease to chronic
diseases epidemiology. In that setting, biomarkers should not be
assessed synchronically, as usually done, but diachronically and even
ideally their full evolution along time should be considered.
This means identifying the biomarkers of environmental exposure and the biomark-
ers of early clinical changes and those of disease. If we can trace the development
of these biomarkers, we will then be able to use the right biomarkers for early
diagnosis as they will be good predictors of the development of disease.
With this aim in view, we will examine existing accounts of productive
causality to see if they can help: processes, complex-system mechanisms, and ca-
pacities. Although this last is not strictly an account of causality, it is connected
with the aim of illuminating causal linking. For this and further reasons that
we will explain, we include it as worth examining. These specific accounts—and
accounts of production more generally—have well known problems, which we
do not address here. But they also have well known virtues, which make them
useful. Space does not allow us to discuss the appropriate place of productive
accounts in causal theory, but later we will nonetheless say something about the
role of mechanisms in EXPOsOMICS research. Ultimately, we will argue that
they are still useful for their known virtues. For now, we will be concerned only
with whether they can illuminate linking in EXPOsOMICS. We also lack space
to examine variants of the accounts in detail, but this will not be necessary to
show the limitations of their application to EXPOsOMICS.
3.2 Processes
The classic approach to productive causality began by looking at physics, in
process accounts. The idea of tracing the evolution of the biomarkers echoes
process-tracing a` la Salmon-Dowe. The ‘combined’ Salmon-Dowe view states
that processes are world lines of objects, and causal processes are those that
transmit conserved quantities (e.g., mass-energy, linear momentum, or charge)
after an interaction between two (causal) processes (Salmon, 1984, 1997; Dowe,
1992, 2000). Most recently, this account has been updated by Boniolo et al.
(2011). This latest account holds the view that the difference between causal
and non-causal processes involves the transmission of extensive, not conserved,
quantities. This approach is able to account for causation in stationary cases,
which the Salmon-Dowe approach could not do.
In many ways, the process tracing accounts set the agenda for philosophi-
cal theories of productive causality. One traditional aim they had was to say
what causality is, in the world, so they are realist about causality. They also
traditionally look to scientific theory and/or practice to find what causality is,
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reckoning that science must have something to say about what causality is. We
will return to this point in section 4. Since Salmon himself abandoned his mark-
transmission account on the grounds that it involved an essential counterfactual
element (Salmon, 1994), we do not discuss it in detail here, although we will
comment on it further in section 4 because we take mark transmission to be a
useful place to start, in order to understand information transmission.
Mark-transmission aside, the Salmon-Dowe process account is clearly tai-
lored to physics, at least in the sense that they use examples from physics only.
Indeed, Salmon’s account was designed to discriminate between pseudo and
genuinely causal physical processes. As such, despite the idea of tracking, and
the fact that it was the only such account available for a long time, it doesn’t
seem to apply to EXPOsOMICS. The systems described in EXPOsOMICS will
presumably obey conservation laws, but we seek more than this. We seek a
fine-grained account of the properties in virtue of which environmental factors
cause disease, and we seek to give an account that makes sense of tracing those
properties through the system from exposure to disease. So the Salmon-Dowe
picture is insufficiently illuminating. In EXPOsOMICS, we do not try to track
either conserved or extensive quantities.
The broader idea of attempting to track some kind of process is, however,
right, and this theory deserves credit for being the only serious attempt to
address causal linking available for a long time. It is not by chance that EXPO-
sOMICS scientists also appeal to concepts that are akin to Salmon’s ‘process’.
We aim in this paper to give a better account of the nature of what is tracked,
an account that is more informative for EXPOsOMICS.
3.3 Complex systems mechanisms
It is natural to turn next to examine complex systems mechanisms. In the
domain of disease causation, scientists frequently use the words ‘system’ and
‘mechanism’ to describe what they’re studying, and background knowledge of
the mechanisms and systems of the body is clearly vital to the work of EXPO-
sOMICS. Broadly, we will adopt the characterization:
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities or-
ganized in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon.
(Illari and Williamson, 2012, p120.)
A great deal is known about the entities or parts of these mechanisms in
disease causation—from bodily organs, to DNA—and their activities or interact-
ions—how they work and influence each other. This knowledge is mechanistic
knowledge, and it is important to EXPOsOMICS. Witness for instance Vineis
and Perera (2007, p1955.):
When combined with the best of the earlier validated biomarkers of
dose, effect, and susceptibility, such new markers have the potential
to add considerably to knowledge about the mechanistic pathways
that relate pathogenic exposures to disease onset and also to serve
as informative early markers of disease risk.
Further, mechanisms underlying causally related variables are ways of capturing
a kind of linking. However, we will argue that mechanisms are not enough for the
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case of EXPOsOMICS. Specifically, the links in mechanisms, while important,
are too coarse grained to capture the linking sought.
This is difficult to see, because mechanisms are important in so many ways.
They are important in setting up hypotheses for EXPOsOMICS, for suggesting
where to look for relevant signs of the action of environmental factors. They
can help select what level to carry out omics analyses at—see also later section
4. Witness again from above Vineis and Perera (2007, p1961):
One of the main challenges with intermediate biomarkers is to under-
stand whether they belong to the causal pathway between exposure
and disease, whether they are simply a side effect of exposure or
disease, or whether their measurement is confounded by some other
exposure. For example, it is likely that certain mutations are gen-
uine intermediate markers in the causal pathway, whereas others are
a consequence of the disease, such as genomic instability that arises
in cancer cells.
Any further things the project finds out about mechanisms will be useful, and
it is likely to find out a lot, contributing considerably to our mechanistic knowl-
edge.
Further, what we do know of mechanisms does help us structure data in
EXPOsOMICS. Current work in causality (initiated by Russo and Williamson
(2007)) has suggested that establishing biomedical causal claims typically re-
quires evidence of mechanisms and of difference-making (correlation in this
case). This is broadly because what is known of linking mechanisms helps
us decide which correlations might indicate causes, and which might well not.
Unfortunately, known mechanisms are only of limited help for EXPOsOMICS.
It is entirely too likely that many of the variables studied are related to many of
the other variables studied. This is the challenge of finding causal links in the
middle of a highly interactive mess. To put it crudely—EXPOsOMICS scien-
tists already knew an interacting system existed before they started the work!
What we know of the mechanisms cannot help us rule out possible causal links
in EXPOsOMICS in any useful way.
In fact, it is not always clear how to think of the links in mechanisms. In
so far as mechanisms are arrangements of interacting parts, we can understand
parts and their activities, but how should we conceptualise linking right across a
mechanism? In the mechanisms literature, a distinction is often made between
constitutive or vertical mechanisms, which break down a phenomenon into parts,
and etiological or horizontal mechanisms, which trace the causal history of a
phenomenon or effect. Harold Kincaid explains:
In the philosophy of science literature [. . . ] mechanisms are usually
thought of as the component processes realizing some higher level
capacities, e.g. the mechanism of memory. I call these ‘vertical mech-
anisms’. However, many requests for mechanisms are about provid-
ing intervening or mediating variables between a putative cause and
its effect. Call these ‘horizontal’ mechanisms. (Kincaid, 2011, p73.)
In the practice of mechanism discovery, however, there is no clear distinction
between finding constitutive and etiological mechanisms. So when we find parts,
how do we find links?
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One possible answer is that the overall action of the whole mechanism, en-
tities activities and organization, gives us linking. But in EXPOsOMICS we
are definitely looking for quantitative relationships, and building a mechanistic
explanation seldom gives you anything quantitative. This is not so in all cases
(see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010)), but even so, there is not enough here.
Another challenge for understanding causal inference using mechanisms is
the relation between the single and the general case. We are interested in
general-case mechanisms, as is the usual primary case in the literature on mech-
anisms, and the kinds of mechanisms that are studied extensively in science.
Glennan is an exception in the mechanisms literature in treating single-case
mechanisms as primary (Glennan, 2011). However, in the practices of causal in-
ference, it is general-case mechanisms that are used as background knowledge to
help structure our inferences going forwards (see Russo and Williamson (2011)).
Nevertheless, the relation between the general-case mechanisms we discover and
particular causal links is not a simple one. In medicine, for example, finding one
mechanism will most often suggest more than one causal link. Frequently, there
is a particular causal link when the mechanism is well-functioning, and there
may be more than one standard result—an alternative causal link—in different
varieties of malfunction.
The core problem here is that mechanisms offer only a coarse-grained at-
tempt to conceptualise some link or other. This is an important role, but
biomarkers try to set up a picture of links as straight lines, as opposed to
the holism of trying to model the entire system—on this last point see also
Russo and Williamson (2012). As biomarkers scientists do, we seek an account
of the causal link that can be more precise. We do not suggest that the idea of
mechanisms can be replaced in EXPOsOMICS, but that the idea needs to be
supplemented.
3.4 Powers
We have argued that saying there’s a system where connections take place isn’t
sufficient to help with causal inference in EXPOsOMICS, because there’s too
much interaction in the system under investigation. What is needed is something
more fine-grained. This means that focusing in more narrowly on the powers of
parts of that system is worth examining, as these powers are more fine-grained
than mechanisms, and so may let us identify something that is more informative.
As with the other metaphysical views we examine, we lack space to consider
variants in detail. Here, we focus on the core approach common to powers,
capacities and dispositions. The idea is that things have powers to do things. For
example, aspirin has the power to cure headaches, when taken in a sensible dose
by someone who has a headache. The claim of philosophers such as Cartwright
(1989) is that at least some of what science does is study the capacities of things.
This is appealing because the idea that certain chemicals have the power,
disposition or capacity to cause certain diseases has intuitive plausibility. The
powers of things is also something you do find out about when studying mech-
anisms. For example, some powers have a mechanistic explanation, such as the
power of cells to metabolise lactose in the absence of glucose, which is due to
the action of the lac operon. And powers are something more specific—more
fine-grained—than mechanisms.
Again, finding powers of the parts of the mechanisms of disease causation is
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certainly useful. It can be very tricky with a complex interacting system, though,
as there is often too much context to attach powers with any real stability to
parts of the system. The whole system behaves pretty unreliably. The parts
only do their stuff in the context they happen to be in. Stable powers would be
great if they could be found, but apart from the very brute things we do know:
how we go from DNA to protein, how the circulatory system works in the body,
and so on, which of course structure a lot of our theorising in EXPOsOMICS,
powers are not going to help us with the next phase of discovery.
Seeking powers, if successful, allows the extraction of something useful from
complex systems, namely what given entities or systems can or cannot do under
specified circumstances. Powers can be useful in explaining causal links. But
this is not the only thing we are looking for in EXPOsOMICS, namely the
linking itself. Powers focus attention on what parts do locally, not on links that
stretch across the system. Looking for evidence for powers can help constrain
what the activities are, and so what the possible causal links are. But this is not
enough. EXPOsOMICS is also looking for very specific, very difficult-to-find,
long-range causal connections!
3.5 The limits of available accounts of production
So the problem of EXPOsOMICS is what counts as causal linking in the mid-
dle of a complex highly interactive system, where many things could be linked
to many others. Their aim is to change the method of assessing exposure to
environmental factors, measuring them at the micro, or chemical, level, and de-
tecting biomarkers of exposure at the micro, molecular level. Then, the intention
is to trace the evolution of biomarkers up to the development of disease.
The traditional views of production examined above all say something in-
teresting about linking, but all have some limitation in their application to the
EXPOsOMICS case. Broadly, the process account is applicable only to physical
causality, and is also quite rigid. The mechanistic account is too coarse-grained,
and doesn’t give a substantive account of what linking itself consists in, par-
ticularly in a way that allows for more than one causal link per general case
mechanism. The powers account is more fine-grained than the mechanistic ac-
count, but does not give an account of linking. We will see in section 5 that
these accounts are still useful. But they do not give the whole story for EXPO-
sOMICS.
What we are looking for instead is an account that is sufficient to capture
how fine-grained are the causes sought in EXPOsOMICS. It also has to be very
general, so that it can apply in multiple cases, and link profoundly inhomoge-
neous causal factors, such as chemical agents and social pressures. Finally, if
the account is to be informative, to serve the aim of informing reasoning about
linking in the science itself, it has to be something that can exist and potentially
be found in such a mess of interactions.
It is because it adds these extra requirements for an account of causal link-
ing that EXPOsOMICS is such a nice case to consider in developing a widely
applicable account of productive causality. It has noted in the philosophical
literature that existing process accounts are not very widely applicable (see for
instance Machamer et al. (2000, p7) for biology and Russo (2009, p18) for social
science research), but mechanisms and powers have not been examined in the
same way. Further, EXPOsOMICS is precisely the kind of case where it is most
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tempting to give up on any kind of account of productive causality at all. Yet
difference-making accounts do not capture everything that is going on in the
reasoning in EXPOsOMICS, as we need reasoning that prioritises some very
fragile difficult to find correlations over others. EXPOsOMICS is a special case,
but it is far from the only case facing such a large quantity of data, or such an
interactive system, while similar projects measuring such divergent factors are
sure to follow soon. As a result, an account that offers the prospect of meeting
the traditional aims of accounts of productive causality and also meeting the
requirements of these kinds of cases should be very interesting both in illumi-
nating reasoning in science, and as a contribution to the philosophical literature
on causality.
4 Information
4.1 Picking up signals
Let us start with the hints coming from biomarkers research, their language of
“picking up signals”:
While classical statistical models to analyzing -omics data serve the
purpose of identifying signals and separating them from noise, little
has been done in chronic diseases to model time into the exposure-
biomarker-disease continuum. (Vineis and Chadeau-Hyam, 2011,
sec.4)
From these two parallel analyses [statistical analyses], we obtained
lists of putative markers of (i) the disease outcome, and (ii) expo-
sure. These were compared in a second step in order to identify
possible intersecting signals, therefore defining potential intermedi-
ate biomarkers. (Chadeau-Hyam et al., 2011, p85)
This is just a hint, and in this section, we aim to spell this out in greater
detail in terms of information, and show how by conceptualising causal link-
ing in EXPOsOMICS informationally we can help both the science, and our
understanding of productive causality in the causality literature.
In presenting this account of causal production as information transmission,
we have three interrelated but distinct aims:
1. Metaphysical: say what causality itself is, starting from EXPOsOMICS
science;
2. Conceptual: provide a concept of productive causality that can answer
needs that have been recognised in the causality literature;
3. Conceptual: provide a concept of productive causality that can answer
the needs of EXPOsOMICS and other similar sciences.
Any of these aims is individually worth achieving. We offer two converging
arguments for the view that information is an answer to our question about
linking because information is real, and referenced in the scientific practice,
in line with the traditional aims of accounts of production. In section 4.2 we
argue that causality as information is a natural development of Salmon’s mark
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transmission theory. This addresses aim 1 in a manner that is standard in
the causality literature. It also addresses aim 2 less directly, although further
arguments have already been offered in Illari (2011b) concerning the problem of
absences as it arises in the causality literature, which we do not touch on here.
We argue that information is naturally the most general thing that can be said
about cases of causal production, and explain how this addresses both aims 1
and 2. In brief, information offers both a very general concept of causal linking,
and a thin metaphysics of causal production which can be widely applicable,
is able to link profoundly inhomogeneous causal factors, and can exist and be
found in a mess of interaction.
To be useful, however, the concept we offer will also need to be informa-
tive, contentful enough to help solve conceptual problems that arise in EXPO-
sOMICS. We will show that this is so, by showing how it addresses a particular
problem in EXPOsOMICS, the inhomogeneity problem, in section 4.3. This
section of course addresses aim 3 directly, but, as we will explain, it also meets
the vacuity versus generality problem which is an obstacle to meeting aims 1
and 2. So addressing the inhomogeneity problem completes our arguments.
4.2 Information as the heir of mark transmission
Looking at the problems of applicability that arise in EXPOsOMICS science,
alongside these interesting remarks about signalling and the central importance
of biomarkers, cannot help but cue the one account of causal production we
have not yet considered: Reichenbach-Salmon’s mark transmission. This is the
theory that Salmon held before the Salmon-Dowe conserved quantities theory,
but it is not much discussed, as Salmon ultimately rejected it himself.
The broad idea of mark transmission is that a process is causal if, and only
if, were we to mark it, that mark would be transmitted to later stages of the
process. So, for example, if we dent a car, the dent is transmitted along with
the movement of the car, and we can detect the mark at these later stages. In
contrast, if we interrupt the shadow of the car, shining a light, for example, to
deform it, that deformation does not travel with the shadow as the car moves,
but instead disappears. This distinguishes real causal processes from pseudo-
processes such as moving shadows which do not transmit marks. It is also a
supremely general account of causal production, as so many different kinds of
processes can be marked. The idea makes sense in all of the sciences.
The problem is that many processes are not actually marked and, most dam-
agingly, some physical processes are impossible to mark without fundamentally
altering them. Fundamental particles have too few degrees of freedom to al-
low marks that do not disturb the original process. This means that the mark
transmission theory must be given, as we gave it above, as a counterfactual
mark transmission theory: if a causal process were marked, the mark would be
transmitted to later stages in the process. This led Salmon to reject the theory,
as he took a counterfactual characterization to be antithetical to the aim of an
account of causal production. For EXPOsOMICS, the mark idea is a different
kind of problem. Biomarkers are many, and carefully sought. But the causal
links sought are often fragile. It is likely that many of the processes could not
have a mark introduced without deforming the original process.
However, the idea of the mark transmission theory can be recaptured by
moving to the idea of information transmission. Information is very like a mark
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in the relevant sense, as information, too, can and will be transmitted by a
causal process. But information does not have to be introduced, as information
is already present in any causal process whatsoever. The car moving is trans-
mitting information, while the shadow moving is not, whether or not we try
to mark either one of them. So the simple formulation: a process is causal if
and only if it transmits information of some kind is already as well specified as
Salmon’s mark transmission account. It shares its major benefit, its applica-
bility, but evades its major flaw. It accords very well with the language of the
science in question. It also accords well with Salmon’s ideas as he presents them
(see also Weber and Vreese (2012)):
It has always been clear that a process is causal if it is capable
of transmitting a mark, whether or not it is actually transmitting
one. The fact that it has the capacity to transmit a mark is merely
a symptom of the fact that it is actually transmitting something
else. That other something I described as information, structure,
and causal influence ... . (Salmon, 1994, p.303)
A current account of causality in terms of information exists in the literature.
It is that of Collier, who holds that causation is the transfer of a particular quan-
tity of information from one state to another (Collier, 1999, 2011). We shall not
further explore his highly technical account of causality in terms of Kolmogorov
complexity here, as we will not adopt it. Ladyman and Ross (2007) offer an al-
ternative account of something like informational causality, in terms of Shannon
information. From the literature on information in maths and computer science,
many formal quantitative measures of information are now available. These give
measures that in general can be applied formally to anything whatsoever. In
other literature, more qualitative accounts of information are discussed, such
as Floridi’s account of semantic information (Floridi, 2011). It is agreed that
semantic information is, at the least, supremely difficult to quantify.
The richness of informational concepts is a challenge for an account of causal-
ity as information transfer, but it is also its greatest virtue. Collier argues that
his aim is to offer an informational account of causality that is general enough
to apply to anything whatsoever. His idea is that in more specific contexts,
further constraints can be added to the general account—which, as we have
said, is already as well-specified as Salmon’s mark transmission account—to say
something more informative about the special cases. But, necessarily, the most
general account can say very little and remain widely applicable. There is a
direct trade-off between an informational account being contentful enough to
be informative, and it being general enough to be widely applicable.
This problem, however, is not specific to an informational account of pro-
duction. It is a challenge for any account of production that aims to be widely
applicable. To make any account applicable right across the sciences will require
removing constraints on what counts as a causal link. To make any account
informative about particular cases of causal links, or links in any particular
domain, requires adding back in such constraints. This is why the richness
of informational concepts is a virtue. The very wide applicability of formal
information-theoretic concepts gives generality, because absolutely anything can
be described informationally using such concepts. However, unlike mark trans-
mission, the formal theories of information, and applications of the idea of infor-
mation across the sciences, offers theoretical resources that also offer narrower,
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but more informative accounts of particular kinds of causal linking. Informa-
tion itself offers both great generality, and also more informative but restrictive
concepts, and resources to offer quantitative measures that may be useful in
different cases. No previous account of causal linking has offered anything of
this kind.
Anscombe (1975) persuaded the causality literature that there is at least
a challenge to be faced in the diversity of worldly causes. Is there any way
to describe all cases of causality, any thing they all share? We have concepts,
both in natural and in scientific language, to describe these causes: binding,
bonding, breaking and so on. Is there any feature all of these more specific
causal concepts share? Our idea is that all of these are instances, or forms, of
information transmission.
In offering an informational account of causality, we are offering, first, a very
general concept of productive causality. In the causality literature, authors have
often evoked the idea of a ‘secret connection’, following Hume (1777), namely
what keeps things together, what links causes and effects, that is the ‘cement
of the universe’, to use the language of Mackie (1974). The hope in giving an
account of productive causality seems to be that science, or philosophy, will
find the element that holds the world of our disparate experiences together.
But in sciences like EXPOsOMICS, we do not find the secret connection, as if
it were an extra missing entity in our ontology. In tracing information, in using
the conceptual apparatus to re-construct any description of reality in causal-
information-theoretic terms, we come to the best understanding we can of what
the world is like.
In this way, the concepts we design to understand the world and our con-
clusions about what we think are in the world are deeply intertwined. This
is a neo-Kantian approach, following that of Floridi (2011). In the first place,
thinking informationally is a way of designing concepts which, in turn, allow
us to grasp important features of the world. What we are doing in offering an
informational account of causality in EXPOsOMICS is creating or designing a
concept of causal linking that is fit for that domain—and hopefully elsewhere.
Coming out of the problem of diversity in the causality literature, we offer a
concept that we think can encompass all the rest. The concept of information
helps with the conceptualisation of linking of causes and effects. In this way,
the extreme generality of the concept of information given to us from mathe-
matical communication theory is an advantage, because information can link
inhomogenous factors (see also section 4.3). It is in this sense that information
transmission is a thin, a minimal, secret connection.
4.3 The inhomogeneity problem
Here we give a positive account of how informational thinking helps in EXPO-
sOMICS. The idea is that it helps with the conceptualisation of links, where the
scientists are struggling to conceptualise links.
To say something more substantive about the need for linking, it is worth
considering the importance of justifying links that are not immediately plausible.
This is a significant concern for scientists. For instance, can mother’s education
cause child survival? How? Or, how can obesity cause lack of self-esteem?
What are the mechanisms and processes from the social to the biological, and
vice-versa? Or what are the mechanisms and processes from the big to the
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small, and vice-versa? Causal links between non-homogenous stuff, such as
social causes having biological effects, or big things causing small things, are not
obviously or non-problematically established in the sciences. The debates about
the status of social epidemiology are paradigmatic in this respect: either social
factors are ‘genuine’ causes, i.e. they are part of the aetiology of disease, or they
are merely ‘extra’ factors to partition the original population of reference. Put
otherwise, the question is whether such factors are causes or merely classificatory
devices. Depending on which option one chooses, social epidemiology says, or
does not say, something substantial about disease causation. Information, and
the reasoning that goes with it, offers a way to make such non-homogenous links
not only plausible but also theoretically justified. Analogous reasoning applies
to the ‘big’ affecting the ‘small’ and vice-versa.
Consider the links that EXPOsOMICS tries to establish. Environmental
exposure is a macro-variable that includes coarse-grained data about pollution,
and we aim to detect effects at the micro-molecular level. Environmental expo-
sure of course consists of pollutants and chemicals we are exposed to. But expo-
sure also needs to be classifiable according to work environment, social class, and
so on, to allow us to take the kinds of actions we wish to take, such as policy ini-
tiatives. So, environmental factors include biological factors, biochemical factors
and socio-economic factors. How can we make the link between environmental
factors and disease plausible, in the way that helps EXPOsOMICS scientists sup-
port their inferences, beyond establishing a ‘coarse-grained’ difference-making
relation between the two?
The solution envisaged in EXPOsOMICS is to change the types of measure-
ment used to trace causes. Environmental exposure is assessed by measuring
the exact levels of individual chemicals in, say, air or water. Thus finer-grained
measurements initially try to restore some kind of scale homogeneity: measure
the level of a pollutant or of a chemical and then measure levels of changes
at genomic, transcriptomic, proteomic, or metabolomic levels. We might think
that because ‘scale’ homogeneity is restored through making all measurements
biological measurements, the problem is solved. Not quite.
One reason is that measurements now taking place at the same level allow
EXPOsOMICS scientists merely to establish another difference-making relation,
but at a much lower level. For instance, they could establish a robust difference-
making relation between the level of a certain chemical in swimming pool water
and the biomarker of early clinical changes of a targeted disease. But this
doesn’t establish a link yet. On the one hand, they need to find the right
‘intermediate’ biomarkers, the ones that are linked to exposure and to disease.
On the other hand, they need to place this reconstructed link into a plausible
network of relations. Recall, the internal exposome is anything that happens
inside the body as a response to external exposure. Whether scientists hit upon
the right intermediate biomarker will be theoretically justified to the extent that
the complex (internal) biochemical mechanisms also include that biomarker.
This means that linking cannot be seen with the naked eye, and not even using
experimental set-ups. Instead, linking is reconstructed by putting together the
many pieces of the evidential puzzle. This requires a lot of empirical evidence
and a lot of interpretation of the evidence using the right concept. The thought
is that information is precisely one concept needed to do that. It is worth noting
that this problem is not specific to EXPOsOMICS. It is shared by experimental
and observational methods alike. In fact, any scientific conclusion is the result
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of a reconstruction and interpretation of evidence.
A second, more important, reason that the problem is not solved is that al-
though homogeneity in the scale of measurement is restored by using biological
measurements, this actually makes the results harder to interpret, because the
interpretation will still have to be at the macro level, i.e. the level of environmen-
tal exposure causing disease. On the one hand, there is a lot of uncertainty and
discussion within EXPOsOMICS projects about the level at which biomarker
analyses have to take place. EXPOsOMICS scientists talk about targeted omics,
when they know at what level—e.g. metabolite—to look for an effect, i.e., they
know already from previous research what biomarkers to look for. They talk
about untargeted omics when they don’t know when or where things will show
up. Biological theory often suggests what level to run omics analyses at, or when
to collect samples, but biological theory is also trying to understand mechanisms
better and thus support EXPOsOMICS. On the other hand, the homogeneity
problem fires back: you measure everything at the micro-level, level of pollu-
tant, and level of metabolite. But ultimately what you want to know is how
and to what extent environmental pollutants cause cancer, and cancer is a much
bigger thing than a change in the level of something in a cell. So everything will
need to be re-interpreted at the macro-level.
More generally, any causal claim derived from biomarkers research will be
an interpretation of very many pieces of the ‘evidential’ puzzle. It will be a
reconstruction of information coming from biomarkers analysis, plus statistics,
plus biological theory. It will be an a posteriori reconstruction of data- or
technology-driven research. In this context, informational thinking helps with
conceptualising production (the linking) as the evolution of biomarkers, from
exposure to early clinical changes, to disease. Informational thinking provides
the conceptual framework for the evolution of the process of disease, to be
reconstructed by putting together various pieces of the evidential puzzle and by
tracing the transmission of relevant marks.
In less complex—or better known—mechanisms or systems, scientists build
up a view of the typical kinds of activities and entities in their fields, and the
typical powers of the entities. For example, mRNA binds to the ribosome, to
allow tRNA to bring amino acids and arrange them according to the code on the
RNA strand to form a polypeptide chain. Scientists come to understand their
classic entities, the DNA and the tRNA in this example, and what they do, their
characteristic activities, the binding, bringing and arranging in this example.
This means scientists working in a particular field begin to get a feeling for what
happens, and what can happen—they get a feel for causal linking. In a system
of the kind faced by EXPOsOMICS, where the vast majority of interactions
are so completely unknown, scientists cannot rely on a pre-existing feel for
possible linking. Further, when a team consists of specialists in biochemistry,
right through to population-level epidemiology, the characteristic entities and
activities of their fields do not easily link up, in the way that scientists working
on protein synthesis get a feel for how bringing and arranging amino acids
ultimately creates proteins. But how do we intuitively link up chemical binding,
and smoke levels in the atmosphere? Each field knows only its own activities and
entities, has little feel for those of other fields, and since this is frontier research,
nobody knows yet how they will integrate. Information lets us conceptualise
links in the discovery process, before we have detailed mechanistic knowledge.
Let us wrap up: traditional epidemiology established difference-making rela-
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tions between macro-variables describing the environment and macro variables
describing diseases by establishing robust correlations (difference-making rela-
tions) between them. But we want to know more: what exactly is in environ-
mental factors that causes e.g. cancer? So EXPOsOMICS scientists go much
smaller: they measure pollution at the chemical level, measure effects of pollu-
tion at the molecular level, using biomarkers. Does this establish a link between
micro-environmental factors and micro-disease? We argued that it doesn’t be-
cause this would just establish another difference-making relation, but at much
lower level. So the problem is not one of scale of measurement: the problem isn’t
solved just by making measurements at the micro-molecular level. To establish
the link we need to find the continuum from exposure to disease, via key stages
of the evolution of biomarkers. What we have to establish is continuous linking,
not just difference-making at a different level of measurement.
So if the homogeneity is not what EXPOsOMICS scientists track, what is
it? Continuity in linking is sought, which is reconstructed from the interpre-
tation of tons of data through very different analyses and using many fields of
expertise. Biomarkers research tries to find the evolution of biomarkers, thus
suggesting a continuity in the process from exposure to disease, and biomarkers
help detect some key stages. The idea is to avoid having a rigid distinction
between kinds of relata at different scales—a rigid distinction between macro
causes and effects, and micro causes and effects. The ‘flow’ of the process of
evolution of disease is not captured by an entity-activity ontology, as used in
mechanisms (see discussion of mechanisms above).
Ultimately, we want to understand the whole system, all the bits, how they
interact, quantitatively, build reliable models of the dynamic evolution of whole
systems under many many different exposure conditions, and the concept giving
the dynamic evolution is information. The flow is in the link, and the link, we
suggest, is given by information. More precisely, it is given by the reconstruction
of the information flow through the different types of analyses. The challenge
is how to represent and conceptualise these diverse kinds of things in a way
that is a) general enough to see similarities and differences and b) not vacuous,
contentless. So it needs to constrain our thinking in some significant ways—
constrain it to enable it (see also the next section on this point).
Now it is true that in the idea of exposome-wide association studies (EWAS),
information is still not well-defined. In GWAS, there is at least some possibility
of a quantitative definition of information, as genes are much more clearly de-
fined than environmental factors, and substantive informational concepts make
sense when applied to genes. However, as we have said, the diversity and rich-
ness of informational concepts, which appears to be a weakness of an informa-
tional approach, is in fact a virtue. There are, for example, qualitative notions
of information that could be applied here. As we have argued, though, the
very general, thin idea of information that we have offered is already helpful in
conceptualising linking in EXPOsOMICS.
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5 Back to traditional accounts of causal produc-
tion: mechanisms as information channels
In pointing to the limits of available accounts of causal production, we did
not mean that they have to be altogether abandoned in favour of a purely
informational approach. We think that an account of causal production as
information transmission can usefully be added to our stock of accounts of causal
production. We are not advocating that informational thinking can replace the
useful work done by the other accounts. In particular, we think information
synthesizes very nicely with accounts of mechanisms, as a way of understanding
EXPOsOMICS research. We also think conserved quantities and capacities,
powers and dispositions are useful in various ways, although we do not address
them further in this paper.
We mentioned earlier that, in the causality literature, there is work showing
that mechanisms are important in causal inference, not least in that evidence of
mechanisms integrates with evidence of difference-making in establishing causal
relationships, particularly in medicine (for a summary of these views, see Clarke
et al. (2012, 2013)). We agree with that view. We will here explicitly address
the connection between this current work on EXPOsOMICS and this previous
work.
Broadly, we take it that the two views are completely compatible if we
understand mechanisms as information channels. The thought is to understand
mechanisms as the channels through which information flows. The entities,
activities and organization of the mechanism set the channel conditions that
allow the flow of information. What we know about these entities, activities
and their organization helps us in finding the more fine-grained causal links we
seek. This is how mechanisms can yield coarse-grained causal linking, which
can usefully be supplemented by fine-grained linking. The structure of the
mechanism, though, is often easier to detect, easier to influence, and so on,
which means that the coarse-grained linking of a mechanism cannot be simply
replaced by a finer-grained account in terms of information flow.
The following metaphor can be used to illustrate this. Production—the
linking—is a branch floating down a river. Production happens in some context,
which can be thought of as the river. With the scientific study of processes,
mechanisms, or capacities or powers we find and define the banks, and perhaps
some of the currents of the river. All this helps track the branch in the river,
including intercepting the branch again after it bobs under the water and can’t
be seen by us for a time. Along the river there are wood factories where we
can process branches to produce inferences, explanations, predictions, etc. The
banks of the river are the mechanism, and they constrain and structure the flow
of the water, which is the information. The flow of the water can be changed by
directly removing or adding water, or dying it orange, or floating a boat on it.
But it can also be changed by altering the banks of the river. Both are useful.
This accords with the extremely important understanding of life as essen-
tially something that can resist thermodynamic entropy. Life stays organized, by
taking in energy, when inanimate things, which cannot take in energy by them-
selves, inevitably degenerate. In succeeding in this, living things have to resist
environmental variation, such as variation in temperature. Many living things,
including cells and multicellular organisms, achieve this precisely by maintain-
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ing an internal environment that suits them, and resisting external changes.
Interestingly, this is the same importance of the internal and external environ-
ments that EXPOsOMICS recognises as the total exposome. Many many of
the mechanisms of life exist to allow organisms to do this, i.e. specifically to
support some kinds of informational transfer, such as food is allowed in, and
proteins urgently needed are made, and resist others, so that extreme tempera-
tures remain outside, with internal temperatures remaining fairly constant, and
invading viruses are not allowed to fulfil their purpose, but are rapidly killed.
This idea also helps address two problems in the mechanisms literature. The
first is the relationship between single-case and general case mechanisms. We
have said that we will concentrate on general-case mechanisms. Certainly, as
science is practised, particularly as causal inference in the sciences proceeds,
what matters are general mechanisms. (The process of mechanism discovery is
discussed extensively in Darden (2006).) Those are the mechanisms that we find,
that then feed into our background causal knowledge, and we use to structure
our thinking about possible causal links. But we can see now that particular
causal links are particular transmissions of information across a mechanism.
This helps address the problem Kincaid (2011) raises of the difference between
horizontal and vertical mechanisms alluded to earlier in the paper. Vertical
mechanisms are the understanding of the banks of the river, the mechanism’s
parts and so on, across which causal influence can be transmitted.
The second problem, not much remarked on, is that mechanisms tend to
maintain more than one causal link. Standardly in the medical literature, for
example, there will be the characteristic upshot of a well-functioning mech-
anism, and of the same mechanism malfunctioning, perhaps in two or more
definite varieties of malfunction. This can be characterised as correct informa-
tion transmission and information transmission misfire in ways that traditional
accounts of mechanism struggle with. This will enable a significantly more
nuanced account of the use of mechanisms in causal inference.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Biomarkers research is an emergent field of research at the crossroads of epidemi-
ology, molecular epidemiology, informatics, biology, and statistics. There are
many innovative aspects to this research. Some concern the methodology, such
as the ‘meeting-in-the-middle’ methodology or the use of omics technologies.
Some others are conceptual, such as the design of the concept of ‘exposome’.
EXPOsOMICS research does not only need to design ‘new’ concepts, such as
the exposome, but also to redesign existing concepts, most notably ‘process’.
EXPOsOMICS scientists aim to trace a particular process: the evolution,
development, or progress, of biomarkers, from exposure to early clinical changes
to the development of disease. But tracing such a process is very different from
what philosophers of causality have previously envisioned as processes, designed
using examples from physics and space-time philosophy. To trace disease pro-
cesses using biomarkers, scientists have to carry out numerous analyses of data,
from different disciplinary perspectives. Further, the evolution of biomarkers
is the upshot of many factors operating at different levels. And the process to
be discovered will provide the ‘missing link’ between environmental factors and
diseases.
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So how can we make sense of this process tracing in EXPOsOMICS? In
the paper we examined traditional accounts of productive causality (processes,
mechanisms, capacities) to see whether they can provide a concept of linking
that meets the challenges we highlighted. We argued that these approaches
have serious limitations in their application to EXPOsOMICS, either because
they provide a concept of linking that is too specific, due to being tied to one
domain; or because they provide a concept of linking that is too coarse-grained
to help with thinking about EXPOsOMICS.
We then investigated the prospects of an informational approach, offering
two converging arguments. First, we argued that thinking of causal production
as information transmission should be seen as an adaptation of Salmon’s mark
transmission account, which inherits its wide applicability but avoids its main
weakness as it does not need to be characterized counterfactually. We explained
how we see this offering a very generally applicable concept allows us also to
express what we have most reason to believe is in the world. We also argued
that the richness of informational concepts is a virtue of the approach, rather
than a vice.
Our second, related, argument was that the thin idea of thinking of causal
production informationally was already enough to help with some conceptual
needs in EXPOsOMICS. This need is conceptualizing the linking of non-homoge-
nous factors. How can ‘macro’ factors such as environmental factors have effects
at the micro, molecular level? We explained that this question cannot be an-
swered merely by changing the scale of measurement. An answer requires con-
ceptualising continuous linking between different types of causes and effects, at
different scales. Continuous linking is established by EXPOsOMICS scientists
via an interpretation of the complex evidential puzzle. Consequently, informa-
tion transmission will not be something extra that we see ‘out there’, another
entity in our ontology. Continuous linking is this minimal metaphysics that we
construct from the evidential puzzle.
Much has to be done to build a full-blown informational approach to pro-
ductive causality. But we hope that we have placed the first corner stones of
such an account. We also hope to raise interest in information, and, in using
scientific research in progress, we show how philosophy and science can work
together on timely issues of common concern.
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